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I. INTRODUCTION
The use of penalties in the tax code seems to be drifting away from
long-held and well-established policy principles, with the gradual
erosion resulting in both unintended consequences and increasing
administrative challenges. The current disarray of penalties in the

∗ Contributing Editor, Tax Analysts. The author is deeply indebted to Chris Rizek for his insightful
guidance on this subject, and thanks the many practitioners of the tax bar who continue to serve as
mentors.
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present tax code is obvious. Critics rightly condemn the present penalty
regime as confusing, draconian, and unfair. But despite growing calls
for action, so far Congress does not seem very receptive to the message
and continues to propose penalty provisions at odds with accepted goals.
The last successful attempt at bringing order to a chaotic structure
of penalty provisions in the tax code occurred in 1989. Like today,
segments of the tax community in the 1980s became vocal over the
growing erratic formation of civil tax penalties, complaining about the
ad hoc nature of penalty enactment, use of penalties as revenue raisers,
and penalty stacking. As a result, an IRS task force and the Joint
Committee on Taxation produced several reports outlining the main
theoretical goals behind a tax penalty system. Among all the various
rationales and purposes possible in a penalty regime, their primary
conclusion was that tax penalties should exist solely to encourage
voluntary compliance.
With that goal in mind, the IRS’s task force enumerated three
guiding principles in its penalty policy statement: (1) helping taxpayers
understand what constitutes acceptable conduct; (2) deterring
noncompliance by imposing costs on that behavior; and (3) ensuring the
perception that the tax system was fair. Congress in 1989 reacted with
legislation—the Improved Penalty Administration and Compliance Tax
Act—that implemented changes to simplify accuracy-related penalties
and information reporting penalties. Since then, minor attention to
additional penalty reform was given a decade later, at the end of the
1990s, but no significant legislation resulted. The first decade of the
twenty-first century has only seen further movement away from
fundamental penalty rationales and a piling up of incoherent penalties,
with many tax observers questioning whether the current system adheres
to the voluntary compliance goal.
This essay examines the historical use of penalties within the tax
code, reviews a number of reports that led to the last round of significant
penalty reform legislation, and considers existing problems of penalty
administration. Several proposals are outlined to ensure that if and when
Congress acts to simplify and revise the penalty regime, the reforms will
have lasting impact. Part II covers the growth of penalties in the tax
system from its original simple form through its significant expansion to
the time that the IRS and Congress worked to cut back the complexity of
the civil tax penalty regime in the late 1980s. Part III considers how
legislative actions over the past decade have created new penalties that
stand out from the outlined policy goals of the IRS Task Force, and the
resulting negative impact on administering the tax code. Part IV looks at
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possible reforms to the penalty system that would institute measures to
help constrain penalties from drifting from defined policy goals.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Penalties Historically

Penalties were few in number and simple in application during the
first few decades following enactment of a permanent income tax
regime. In 1955, after the adoption of the 1954 tax code, there were
only fourteen penalty provisions.1 Today, the number of penalty
provisions has grown rapidly to more than 130.2 Penalties in the 1954
tax code centered on enforcing basic filing and understatement
obligations through failure to file, failure to pay, negligence, and fraud
penalties.3 These penalties were designed as simple tools to encourage
voluntary compliance by taxpayers with our self-assessing tax system.
Between 1955 and 1989, however, Congress put into place a
number of new penalties, including sanctions on employee plans,
exempt organizations, and return preparers4—measures not necessarily
targeted at increasing voluntary compliance.5 The spate of individual
tax shelters that came to the fore in the 1980s led to even more rules
crafted by Congress and the IRS aimed at greater disclosure and punitive
consequences for perceived taxpayer abuse of the tax code.6 Shelterrelated penalties covering promoter registration, substantial
underpayments, and information reporting were added or refined.7 The
current penalty regime we face today has moved well beyond basic
filing and understatement penalties and now encompasses a wide swath
of behavior that seems concentrated on punishing certain taxpayer
action, including information reporting failures and valuation
misstatements.
1. TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., NATIONAL TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE: 2008 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS VOL. 2, at 7 (2008), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/08_tas_arc_vol2.pdf (last visited February 19, 2011) [hereinafter
2008 NTA Report].
2. Id.
3. U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON
PENALTY AND INTEREST PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 19 (1999) [hereinafter
Treasury Report].
4. Id. at 21-25.
5. Id. at 21.
6. Id. at 22-23.
7. Id. at 23-25.
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It was at the height of congressional reaction to combat tax shelter
activity through penalties that the IRS and Joint Committee on Taxation
undertook extensive studies of the penalty system. The review was
necessary because “the absence of a systematic approach to the
enactment, assertion and abatement of penalties is a serious problem.”8
B.

1989 Reforms

The IRS Task Force put together by then-IRS Commissioner
Lawrence Gibbs was a broad-based effort involving research and
feedback from nearly all divisions of the Service and was intended to
address “complaints about the design and administration of sanctions
[that] required principled responses based on the role of penalties in the
tax system rather than symptomatic treatments.”9 After significant
study, the final IRS Task Force report outlined a comprehensive basis
for an equitable penalty regime in the tax code and set out fundamental
characteristics of any such scheme to guide future legislative efforts.10
Foremost among the IRS’s conclusions was that tax penalties
should exist solely to encourage voluntary compliance.11 Because the
U.S. tax system is based on self-assessment, using penalties to bolster
voluntary compliance can work to make the system efficient, accurate,
and less intrusive.12 Furthering voluntary compliance could best be
achieved by setting out acceptable standards of conduct, imposing costs
to deter noncompliance, and establishing a sense of fairness.13
The IRS delineated four core pillars of sound tax penalty policy:
fairness, effectiveness, comprehensibility, and ease of administration.14
According to the IRS, in order to imbue the tax system with a perception
of fairness, the tax code must treat similarly situated taxpayers the same
(horizontal equity).15 Otherwise, taxpayers will lose respect and support
for the tax system if they don’t think a penalty is consistently applied.16
IRS policy states that a proper penalty regime must exhibit fairness and
proportionality so that the penalty imposed bears the right relationship to

8. See EXECUTIVE TASK FORCE FOR THE COMMISSIONER’S PENALTY STUDY, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES 30 (1989) [hereinafter IRS Task Force Report].
9. Id. at acknowledgements section.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 19.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 33-34.
14. IRS Task Force Report, supra note 8, at 19.
15. Id. at 39; see also I.R.M. 1.2.20.1.1 (June 29, 2004).
16. IRS Task Force Report, supra note 8, at 40.
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the taxpayer’s culpability and resulting harm to the tax system.17 The
penalty system must operate on procedural fairness so that taxpayers are
penalized only if they deserve it.18
Under a second IRS goal of effectiveness, a penalty must balance
the need to eliminate noncompliance without becoming disproportionate
or unfair. Essentially, effectiveness is driven by imposing costs at just
the right level to deter violations. One measure of effectiveness is
basing the sanction on the level of benefit the taxpayer expects to receive
from his noncompliance.19
On the other hand, a taxpayer should
likewise be motivated to take remedial action upon discovering
noncompliance. So, a penalty should potentially offer a way for the IRS
to use it while still encouraging voluntary correction.20 A graduated
penalty system is an example of these factors interacting to produce an
effective result, tying the level of sanction imposed to the length or
severity of a taxpayer’s noncompliance.
The IRS also believes that taxpayers must understand the conduct
expected of them in a penalty regime (comprehensibility). This
principle is one of the most difficult to achieve because of the wide
variety of knowledge and skills among taxpayers. A penalty should
provide for the appropriate standard of behavior based on the taxpayer’s
sophistication, expecting a base level of conduct for average taxpayers
while perhaps allowing for more gradation toward those with a greater
grasp of complexity.21
Finally, penalty administration must allow sufficient means for
imposing a sanction while retaining the ability for the IRS to exercise
discretion in appropriate circumstances.22
Setting out a clear and
appropriate standard of behavior requires properly categorizing
taxpayers based on possible noncompliant conduct. But the level of
detail that allows the tax administrator to follow written rules in
determining if a sanction is applicable can come into conflict with ease
of administration. Ambiguous guidelines give the IRS the ability to deal
with new or unusual factual situations, but can frustrate taxpayers when
standards are not adequately defined. On the other hand, an excessive
17. Id. at 41
18. Id. at 40.
19. Id. at 41-42.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, PENALTY REFORM TASK
FORCE, REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES: THE NEED FOR REFORM 3 (2009) (“Penalties should
treat similarly situated taxpayers similarly and have sufficient flexibility to account for differences
in the particular facts and circumstances of each case.”) [hereinafter AICPA Report].
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level of specificity binds the IRS’s hands or creates impractical
administrative hurdles.23 Administrability is also affected by the penalty
amounts at issue; if too high, either the taxpayer engages in tactics
(sometimes questionable) to avoid it, or the IRS fears to impose it.
Limited resources as well impact the extent to which the IRS can engage
in administering the penalty regime.
The IRS Task Force specifically rejected other rationales that,
while permissible in a penalty regime, were ultimately deemed
inconsistent with the primary goal of encouraging voluntary compliance.
The rejected purposes included raising revenue, punishing noncompliant
behavior, and reimbursing the government for the cost of compliance
programs.24 For example, although penalties raise revenues collaterally,
acceptance of revenue raising as grounds for a penalty regime “confuses
the different roles of substantive tax rules and penalties.”25 If the goal of
a penalty is to grow the fisc through collection, the penalty cannot be
considered as motivated by enhancing voluntary compliance. Indeed, a
truly effective penalty in design would collect little or no additional
revenue because the increase in taxpayer compliance would negate the
need for penalty assertion.
Pursuing penalties as a way to reimburse an administrative program
also conflicts with enhancing voluntary compliance, as the level of
resources necessary to administer the program “is not necessarily
synchronized with the severity required to obtain maximum
compliance—it may be either too high or too low.”26
The IRS Task Force report recognized punishment as a coterminous
mechanism for achieving voluntary compliance, but not as an
independent goal in itself.27
Devising penalties to punish
noncompliance can lead to severe results best dealt with in a criminal
context. To the extent the consequences of a penalty go beyond what is
appropriate in a civil context, the resulting severity will likely have “an
adverse impact on taxpayer attitudes” about the system’s fairness.28 In
other words, a penalty should “deter bad conduct without deterring good
conduct or punishing the innocent.”29
23. IRS Task Force Report, supra note 8, at 45 (“Either the administrator becomes a parser of
complex rules, substituting the result required by the rule for the judgment that the case may
require; or he bends the written rule to reach the result that he feels is reasonable.”).
24. Id. at 35.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 36.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See AICPA Report, supra note 22, at 1.
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The report made several significant recommendations for tax
administrators to follow: adopt a single penalty policy statement
recognizing the purpose of civil tax penalties to encourage voluntary
compliance; develop a comprehensive penalty handbook; revise training
programs; improve taxpayer communication regarding penalties; review
IRS letters and notices; improve informational capabilities on penalty
administration; and develop a comprehensive database capable of
providing penalty administration statistical information.30
The work of the IRS Task Force spurred Congress to take up
wholesale reform of the civil tax penalty system. As a result, the 1989
Improved Penalty Administration and Compliance Tax Act31 (IMPACT)
simplified and rationalized the penalty structure, as well as spurred
administrative changes. One of the most significant modifications was
the reorganization of all the accuracy-related penalties into one single
code provision, section 6662, at a single rate (except for gross valuation
misstatements).32 Prior to the act, penalties for negligence, substantial
understatements, and valuation under- and overstatements had been in
separate provisions, making it possible and likely for multiple sanctions
to apply to one infraction. A reasonable cause exception was
incorporated in section 6664 and made applicable to all of the accuracyrelated penalties. Furthermore, the legislation created a uniform
definition of underpayment, and crafted rules so that an accuracy-related
penalty only applied to the applicable portion of an underpayment.
C.

Post-1990

After the major 1989 penalty overhaul, the early 1990s brought
mostly minor legislative penalty revisions to the tax code. In addition to
modifying estimated tax payment rules, Congress adjusted the accuracyrelated penalty disclosure standard from “not frivolous” to “reasonable
basis,” imposing a heightened standard to discourage taxpayers from
taking unreasonable return positions.33 Congress also took away an
exception to the substantial understatement penalty in the case of

30. Id.; see also I.R.M. 20.1.1.1.1(2) (Feb. 22, 2008).
31. Enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239,
103 Stat. 2106 (1989).
32. See id. § 7721(a).
33. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312
(1993).
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corporate tax shelters by only allowing a penalty to be avoided in the
case of reasonable cause.34
But only a decade after the IMPACT reforms, the Treasury returned
to the issue of possible penalty reform. As part of the IRS Restructuring
and Reform Act of 1998, which drastically changed the organization and
operations of the Service, Congress mandated that the Treasury and the
JCT again study penalty and interest provisions in the tax code.35 The
Treasury report36 made a number of recommendations regarding various
types of penalty provisions. Of particular note was that the Treasury
encouraged Congress to harmonize the substantial understatement and
negligence penalties to better distinguish which portions of an
understatement each related to.37 The report also recommended
imposing the same accuracy standards on taxpayers and return
preparers.38 The Treasury suggested that the IRS take steps to “ensure
greater consistency in the application of penalty abatement criteria.”39
D.

IRS Efforts

Following the enactment of IMPACT, the IRS moved to develop
consolidated guidelines regarding penalties that captured in formal
administrative form the policy rationales established by the IRS Task
Force in encouraging voluntary compliance. The IRS’s primary
handbook for administering penalties is set forth in the various
subsections of IRM 20.1, which outline the criteria and procedures for
asserting, not asserting, and abating penalties. The IRS says the IRM
penalty is designed to be both an “everyday reference guide” as well as a
“training document.”40
As reflected in IRM 20.1, the IRS also eventually took the step of
trying to establish a central coordination point within the Service to
handle penalty policy and administration.
The IRS Office of
Servicewide Penalties (OSP) was created and placed within the Small
Business/Self-Employed Division’s Exam Policy branch.41 The OSP is

34. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809
(1994).
35. See IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3801, 112 Stat.
685, 782 (1998).
36. Treasury Report, supra note 3.
37. Id. at 109.
38. Id. at 6.
39. Id. at 8.
40. See I.R.M. 20.1.1.1.2 (Dec. 11, 2009).
41. See id. I.R.M. 20.1.1.1.3 (Dec. 11, 2009).
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overseen by a program manager that presumably reports up the SB/SE
chain.42 Yet aside from aspirational goals set out in the IRM, little is
known about the structure and operations of the OSP.43
The OSP is supposed to act as the clearinghouse and approval
source for penalty guidance—at least on paper.44 In an effort to ensure
consistency in penalty administration, the office has “overall
responsibility” for penalty programs and updating IRM 20.1.45 But
according to a 2009 GAO study,46 the OSP has not been fulfilling its
obligation of comprehensively evaluating civil tax penalty
administration and corresponding voluntary compliance efforts. The
office seems to have been focused more on short-term analytical goals
while neglecting to collect the information necessary to determine the
effectiveness of penalties. In fact, the GAO report rapped the OSP for
not having “a plan for fulfilling its responsibilities.”47 The GAO
recommended that the IRS develop a plan to “focus [OSP’s] efforts” on
its mandate.48
The failure to collect sufficient data prevents the IRS, Treasury, and
Congress from evaluating how penalties are operating, whether there is
consistent application of penalties, and the effect current penalties have
on voluntary compliance. The GAO said a plan should be developed to
lay out feasible research goals and identify resource requirements for the
OSP.49 Particular data that the OSP does not currently collect includes
the level of assessment and abatement rates for penalties, differences in
penalty application to taxpayers based on size or representation, and
geographical disparities in application rates.50

42. The AICPA Report, supra note 22, at page 16, suggests the OSP should be taken out from
under SB/SE and placed under the oversight of the Deputy Commissioner of Service and
Enforcement.
43. I.R.M. 20.1.1.1.3 (“Servicewide Penalties is charged with coordinating policy and
procedures concerning the administration of penalty programs, ensuring consistency with the
penalty policy statement, reviewing and analyzing penalty information, researching taxpayer
attitudes and opinions, and determining appropriate action necessary to promote voluntary
compliance.”).
44. I.R.M. 20.1.1.1(4) (Dec. 11, 2009) (While IRS functions “may develop additional
guidance or reference materials for their specific functional administrative needs,” those materials
“must receive approval from the Servicewide Penalties group.”).
45. Id. I.R.M. 20.1.1.1.2.1, 20.1.1.1.3 (Dec. 11, 2009).
46. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-567, IRS SHOULD EVALUATE
PENALTIES AND DEVELOP A PLAN TO FOCUS ITS EFFORTS (2009) [hereinafter GAO Report].
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
Analyses of trends in penalty data could help IRS identify areas that need further
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In discussions with former IRS officials familiar with the
operations of the OSP, those individuals highlighted several key
deficiencies of the office.51 While the OSP was at one time expected to
engage in sophisticated research, that skill is not in place. The focus of
the office needs to be rebalanced to include more policy concerns, as the
primary concentration is currently on administrative functions. Also,
because the OSP is meant to serve as the contact point for policy
coordination and changes to penalty guidance, there is a need to
centralize approval processes among the various IRS functions. The
OSP should conduct more servicewide training on applying penalty
provisions, in order to reinforce throughout the organization that
penalties are never meant to be used as revenue raisers.52
As will be seen in the next section, the IRM and the OSP, acting as
formal structures within the IRS to handle and coordinate administrative
penalty issues, have not fulfilled their design in helping implement the
fundamental policy goals expressed by the IRS Task Force. Better
attention needs to be paid to adhering to the written intent of the penalty
handbook and conforming administrative efforts to those guidelines.
III. THE CURRENT PROBLEMS
A.

A Call to Action

A white paper produced by the American Institute for Certified
Public Accountants cites concerns that Congress has experienced a “loss
of direction” in the underlying theory of penalties, characterizing some
legislative approaches as “ad hoc efforts to craft penalties and an
increase in the use of penalties, rather than the substantive tax laws, to
drive tax policy.”53 That admonition rings clear in light of the dearth of
sound policy justifications for recently enacted and proposed penalty
measures.
investigation and when penalties may not be applied consistently and fairly. For
example, a low assessment rate could indicate that a penalty is effective deterring
noncompliance and that the infrequency of its assessment is appropriate. However, a
low assessment rate might also indicate that a penalty has become outdated or is deemed
too burdensome to assess. Similarly, a high abatement rate could indicate that IRS
officials are hesitant to sustain a penalty because they deem it too harsh for the
infraction.
Id.
51. February 2, 2010 telephone interview conducted by author with two former IRS senior
leadership officials who requested anonymity to speak freely on OSP.
52. Id.
53. See AICPA Report, supra note 22, at 1.
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Given the widespread recognition that penalties have drifted from
the fundamental principles set out in 1989, proponents of civil tax
penalty reform have been increasing the intensity of their calls for action
in the past several years. In the twenty years since the last major
legislative overhaul of the penalty regime, critics have become
increasingly dismayed by congressional efforts to craft penalties that no
longer conform to a penalty structure rooted in the core goal of voluntary
compliance.
Several trade groups have bolstered the effort to draw attention to
the situation by publishing new white papers on the topic.54 The reports
have highlighted what is perceived to be a trend away from penalty
provisions that encourage voluntary compliance and instead toward
penalties that lack clear standards, have disproportionate impact, erode
basic procedural due process, and are automatically assessed.55 Part of
the problem, according to the AICPA report, stems from Congress’s
“tendency to enact new and higher penalties rather than determine how
to maximize the impact of existing laws and penalties.”56
Disproportionate penalties—those where the imposition amount is
not related to the degree of misconduct at issue or the resulting degree of
harm—as well as stacking of penalties through overlapping provisions,
threatens to “undermine faith in the fairness of the system,” the AICPA
has warned.57 The American Bar Association Section of Taxation also
produced a recent policy statement in favor of penalty reform that
cautioned against moving away from the principles that generated the
1989 reform legislation.58 “Nothing has changed in the past twenty
years to change our views on these guiding principles,” the white paper
stated.59 In particular, the paper said that creating new penalties that
apply on top of existing penalties leads to increased complexity,
produces multiple sanctions, and diminishes the perception that the tax
system is reasonable.60 According to the ABA tax section, since the
54. For news coverage, see Jeremiah Coder, News Analysis: Waiting for Penalty Reform,
TAX NOTES TODAY 131-4 (2009).
55. See AICPA Report, supra note 22, at 1.
56. Id. at 4.
57. Id. at 9. That view is also relayed by Richard Lavoie, Analyzing the Schizoid Agency:
Achieving the Proper Balance in Enforcing the Internal Revenue Code, 23 AKRON TAX J. 1, 2
(2008) (“[T]axpayer compliance is linked to perceptions regarding the overall fairness of the tax
system. When taxpayers perceive the [IRS] as overreaching, they lose faith in the system and
voluntary compliance is harmed.”).
58. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF TAXATION, STATEMENT OF POLICY
FAVORING REFORM OF FEDERAL CIVIL TAX PENALTIES (Apr. 21, 2009) [hereinafter ABA Report].
59. Id. at 5.
60. Id. at 4.
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passage of IMPACT, what has developed is a “confusing array of vague
definitions and overly complicated rules.”61
A telling review several years ago of all 130 penalty provisions in
the tax code by the National Taxpayer Advocate showed that a good
number of existing penalties are merely deadweight. A 2007 listing of
penalty assessments by statutory provision reveal that thirty-five code
provisions had no penalty assessments in that year, and that another
eight provisions had fewer than five assessments.62 Thus, roughly onethird of current penalty provisions are having no effect on tax
administration.
The IRS task force report warned that the “absence of a unified
approach” to the penalty regime “encourages views of penalties as a
panacea for all compliance problems, with increases in severity
substituting for more thoughtful attempts to solve existing compliance
problems.”63 That admonition rings true in today’s chaotic penalty
environment.
B.

Strict Liability

One problematic feature of recent penalties is the frequency with
which they contain strict liability components. Essentially, attaching
strict liability to a traditional penalty removes the ability for taxpayers to
counter the penalty by showing that their action or return position should
be excused because of reliance on accepted factors (i.e. reasonable
cause).
In attempting to push back against the wave of corporate tax shelter
transactions that arose in the 1990s and led to the tax shelter litigation
wars in the early 2000s, Congress increasingly relied on new penalty
provisions that attempted to attack the perceived abusive behavior by
restricting traditional penalty defenses. These rules moved away from a
factual inquiry-based approach with proportionate sanction amounts, and
instead manifested “strict liability” features by disallowing reasonable
cause relief, prohibiting judicial review, limiting waiver authority, or
introducing narrow rescission provisions.64 Currently, there are eight
strict liability penalty provisions in the tax code,65 including the section
61. Id. at 6.
62. See 2008 NTA Report, supra note 1, at 40, Appendix A, Table 4 (The Number of FY
2007 Assessments for Selected Civil Tax Penalties by Internal Revenue Code Section).
63. IRS Task Force Report, supra note 8, at 30.
64. See AICPA Report, supra note 22, at 9.
65. See Clinton Stretch, Matthew Lay & John Galotto, Economic Substance and Strict
Liability Do Not Mix, TAX NOTES 1357, 1359 (2009). Also, in March 2010, the Health Care and
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6695A valuation penalties and section 6662(d) accuracy-related
penalties for tax shelters, but the number seems to be growing as time
passes.
The rise in the number of penalties with strict liability provisions
has garnered scrutiny among practitioners and academics. When
Congress reacts by penalizing abusive behavior, the resulting strains to
good tax administration can overshadow and diminish much of the
original intent behind a penalty system. One commentator has stated
that strict liability penalties “by definition punish taxpayers with
mitigating circumstances, including those who attempt to comply with
the law in good faith.”66 In binding the IRS’s hands, Congress has
created “little agency flexibility” to fashion relief should a penalty
provision lead to harsh unintended consequences. The notion behind
strict liability seems to be “in direct conflict with the reform principles
offered by [many] important stakeholders.”67
In the case where “taxpayers frequently violate the rule” and thus
incur a strict liability penalty, “the penalty may not be promoting
voluntary compliance very effectively.”68 The fact that so-called strict
liability penalties are contested on a frequent basis also gives pause in
considering whether the design of such penalties is appropriate. Because
a successful penalty should probably not be proposed or litigated very
often, “frequent litigation could be a sign that taxpayers are not satisfied
with the fairness of a penalty.”69 Strict liability “also negatively affects
tax administration because it requires a higher expenditure of
governmental resources to defend the imposition of the penalty.”70
One strict liability penalty provides a telling example of the
unintended severe impacts on penalty administration. As part of the
2004 American Jobs Creation Act,71 Congress enacted a new information
reporting penalty, section 6707A, for failing to disclose reportable
transactions. As originally enacted, unless a required disclosure of a
reportable transaction described in reg. section 1.6011-4 is made on a
Form 8886, Reportable Transaction Disclosure Statement, taxpayers
could have been assessed a $10,000 penalty for each instance of

Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010), added section
6662(b)(6) and (i) for transactions lacking economic substance.
66. Stretch et al., supra note 65, at 1359.
67. Id. at 1358.
68. See 2008 NTA Report, supra note 1, at 15.
69. Id. at 13.
70. See Stretch et al., supra note 65, at 1359.
71. American Jobs Creation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004).
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nondisclosure if an individual, or $50,000 if a business entity.72 The
penalty was even higher if the transaction was a listed transaction, in
which case the applicable penalty is $100,000 for individuals and
$200,000 for other returns. The statute allowed the IRS Commissioner
to abate non-listed reportable transaction penalties, but not for listed
transactions.73
The primary effect in applying the old section 6707A penalty so far
has been to assess enormous penalty amounts against taxpayers who
failed to file Form 8886 yet recognized little to no tax benefit from a
deemed reportable transaction. For example, a small business owner
who started a pension plan for her employees and paid $13,000 in taxes
on the plan, was assessed a $1.4 million penalty for failing to disclose
the transaction.74 Other similar instances were also documented in
hearings before Congress in 2009.75
Even in spite of widespread and bipartisan congressional support to
limit application of the section 6707A penalty to truly abusive
transactions, efforts to pass legislative modifications took a long time to
come to fruition. After numerous letters from congressional members
were sent to the IRS complaining of the unintended harsh consequences
the penalty was having on individuals and small businesses, the IRS
announced that it was temporarily suspending collection of the section
6707A penalty in instances where the annual tax benefit was less than
the amount of the penalty that would have been imposed.76 The
temporary collection suspension was extended several times by the IRS
in hopes that Congress would eventually take concrete action on
proposed legislation to reform the penalty.77
Finally, as part of the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, section
6707A was amended to retroactively reduce the nondisclosure penalty
for reportable and listed transactions to 75 percent of the nondisclosure’s
tax benefit, with a minimum $10,000 penalty and maximum of $50,000

72. I.R.C. § 6707A (2006).
73. Id.
74. See Small Business Council of America, Submission for the Record, Ways & Means
Subcommittee on Oversight Hearing on IRS Operations: The Unintended, Draconian Impact of
Code Section 6707A – Examples In “Real Life” From Taxpayers Residing Throughout The
Country, TAX NOTES TODAY 106-36 (2009).
75. See Internal Revenue Service Operations and Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Proposals:
Hearing before the Comm. on Ways & Means, 111th Cong. 17 (2009) (statement of Ga. John Lewis,
Chairman, Comm. on Ways & Means).
76. See Letter from IRS Commissioner Douglas Shulman to House Ways and Means
Committee (July 6, 2009), in TAX NOTES TODAY 128-15 (2009).
77. See the Small Business Penalty Relief Act of 2009, H.R. 4068, 111th Cong. (2009).
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per reportable transaction, or maximum $200,000 for a listed
transaction.78 The minimum penalty in the case of an individual would
be $5,000. There have also been legislative proposals to add a
reasonable cause exception to section 6707A for failure to disclose a
reportable transaction, but no significant recent movement has been seen
on those proposed bills.79
As noted in the GAO report, penalty amounts have to be set at
appropriate levels to positively affect taxpayer behavior. “Some
penalties may be too low to change behavior but others may be so high
that examiners are reluctant to assess them.”80 The IRS Task Force
warned that severe sanctions “tend to be neutralized by nonimposition”
because taxpayers fight back harder.81 According to anecdotal reports
from practitioners, that seems to be the case in many instances where
section 6707A could be applied. Because the penalty amount is so high
and the consequences so severe if asserted, IRS personnel have been
hesitant to apply the penalty in as many cases as it might be applicable.
Uncertainty regarding the amount of the penalty that might be imposed
for a simple foot fault also causes high taxpayer anxiety.
According to the GAO report, as of January 2009, the Service had
asserted the section 6707A penalty in only ninety-eight cases for a total
of $13.7 million.82 The inherent bind present in such circumstances is
that penalties do little good if they are not used out of fear of swinging a
sledgehammer to slice bread.83 As the NTA put it, “IRS employees may
find reasons not to enforce penalties perceived to be unfairly harsh.”84
One problem with strict liability penalties is that the intent behind
such provisions seems to be a desire to punish taxpayers for perceived
abusive behavior, rather than to encourage compliance.85 Yet, the tax
law is extremely complex, made even more so by the addition of new tax
code provisions that Congress regularly passes. Aside from any
attempts by some taxpayers to game the system to avoid paying taxes,

78. Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-240, 124 Stat. 2504.
79. See S. 765, 11th Cong. (2009); H.R. 2143, 111th Cong. (2009).
80. See GAO Report, supra note 46, at 9.
81. See IRS Task Force Report, supra note 8, at 46 (“Taxpayers, perceiving the penalty as
unfair, tend to contest it, leading to more appeals, complaints, adverse publicity and bad relations
between IRS and practitioners.”).
82. See GAO Report, supra note 46, at 14-15.
83. See Richard Stark, A Principled Approach to Collection and Accuracy-Related Penalties,
TAX NOTES 124 (2001). “There is little to be gained from a penalty that is not or cannot be used
effectively by the IRS.” Id.
84. See 2008 NTA Report, supra note 1, at 10.
85. See ABA Report, supra note 58, at 10; Stretch et al., supra note 65, at 1359.
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many taxpayers in regular circumstances can be uncertain of how the
law treats certain transactions.86 Taking away the ability to show why
certain conduct was pursued, and the motives behind it, forces taxpayers
to shun self-correction and avoid transparency with the government—
actions directly in contrast with the stated goals of the penalty regime.
This can lead to what policy observers characterize as “playing the audit
lottery.” As the ABA tax section recognized, strict liability penalties
“eliminate the opportunity, and the incentives, to remediate and to
become compliant.”87
Moreover, many of the enacted strict liability penalties have been
focused on penalizing reporting errors rather than improper behavior.
Sticking with section 6707A as an example, many taxpayers find it
difficult to determine if a transaction they engaged in is “substantially
similar” to another transaction deemed reportable or listed by the IRS.88
This can especially be the case if the transaction is considered to be “run
of the mill” or otherwise follows generally accepted practices within the
tax community. Thus, a penalty for failure to properly disclose the
transaction on a Form 8886 attached to a return and also sent to the
Office of Tax Shelter Analysis is not a result of the substance of the
underlying transaction, but rather is based solely on guessing that
compliance with a special information reporting regime is required. A
policy that creates “traps for the unwary”89 seems to plainly violate
horizontal equity.90
Consistent with good tax policy, taxpayer return disclosures should
be narrowly tailored and designed to root out specific information. Yet
congressional focus on tax shelters has produced statutory and
regulatory language—such as that under sections 6662 and 6011—that
requires additional information disclosure by a taxpayer without clearly
defining the terrain it wants disclosed.91 The lack of transparency in this
area regarding clearly articulated standards of behavior for taxpayers to
86. See Lawrence M. Hill & Alexandra Minkovich, Tax Policy Gone Wild: Penalties as
Revenue Raisers, TAX NOTES 4 (2007). “A strict liability penalty is an especially harsh, if not
inequitable, punishment in cases in which there is significant doubt as to whether the person is
subject to liability for the penalty.” Id.
87. See ABA Report, supra note 58, at 10.
88. See AICPA Report, supra note 22, at 5 (bemoaning the fact that “neither the term ‘tax
shelter’ nor ‘a significant purpose’ has been clearly defined.”).
89. Id.
90. See 2008 NTA Report, supra note 1, at 23 (“Because the penalty is not subject to a
reasonable cause exception, it does not treat taxpayers who made similar efforts to comply
similarly—those who fail through no fault of their own are penalized to the same extent as those
who intentionally fail disclose a transaction—arguably failing to achieve horizontal equity.”).
91. See Stark, supra note 83, at 127.
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follow leads to this disparity of treatment. That is why the AICPA
report knocked the current penalty system for failing to “treat similarly
situated taxpayer similarly [with] sufficient flexibility to account for
differences in the particular facts and circumstances of each case.”92
A result many tax policy observers see flowing from strict liability
provisions is increased litigation. If there is no avenue or mechanism for
taxpayers to present mitigating circumstances or evidence to the IRS in
the face of an asserted penalty, taxpayers are more likely to take the
issue to court to battle over the correctness of the underlying
transaction.93 As one practitioner has noted, “strict liability is arguably
appropriate only when taxpayers have violated known legal standards,
not amorphous principles.”94 Such actions impose a greater cost on tax
administration from having to defend the penalty assertion in a judicial
setting. This is not a good outcome for sound tax policy.95
C.

Limiting Reasonable Cause

Another troubling occurrence that puts the current penalty regime at
odds with time-honored penalty policy goals is the trend toward limiting
the ability of taxpayers to present a defense when a penalty is imposed.
The reasonable cause exception for accuracy-related penalties, section
6664(c), was added to the tax code in 1989 as part of IMPACT.96 In
order to avoid an accuracy-related penalty, a taxpayer must be able to
show that there was a reasonable cause for the tax underpayment and
that there was a good faith belief surrounding the taxpayer’s conduct or
position. Removing the defense diminishes fundamental fairness, and
Treasury has noted that the availability of reasonable cause waivers “is
generally sound tax policy.”97 Indeed, a reasonable cause defense has

92. See AICPA Report, supra note 22, at 3.
93. See 2008 NTA Report, supra note 1, at 13. According to the NTA 2008 annual report, the
accuracy-related penalty was the fifth most litigated issue, accounting for about nine percent of the
cases, where taxpayers prevailed in 43 percent such cases when represented by counsel. The NTA
also noted that “frequent litigation could be a sign that taxpayers are not satisfied with the fairness
of a penalty.” Id.
94. See Hill & Minkovich, supra note 86, at 5.
95. See Stretch et al., supra note 65, at 1359 (“Strict liability also negatively affects tax
administration because it requires a significant higher expenditure of governmental resources to
defend the imposition of a penalty. A penalty such as the proposed economic substance penalty will
ensure and increase litigation as taxpayers are unable to compromise the underlying issue
administratively with the IRS without payment of the large penalty amount.”).
96. See Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7721(a), 103 Stat. 2398, 2399 (1989) (repealed).
97. See Treasury Report, supra note 3, at 125.
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been a central component of most penalty provisions since the 1954 tax
code.98
One example of a penalty provision that has been introduced, with
reasonable cause stripped away, is the recently codified economic
substance doctrine. As part of the reconciliation fixes to the healthcare
reform bill,99 Congress enacted a new underpayment penalty for
transactions that lack economic substance. Section 6662(b)(6) makes
noneconomic substance transactions subject to a 20 percent
underpayment penalty, and section 6662(i) increases the penalty to 40
percent if the transaction was not separately disclosed. Of significant
importance is that sections 6664(c)(2) and (d)(2) were added to remove
the reasonable cause exception for any penalty applied to noneconomic
substance transactions, including reportable transactions described in
section 6662(b)(6). These restrictions on providing a penalty defense
come despite considerable taxpayer uncertainty on when the economic
substance doctrine will apply. Valuation penalties and tax shelters are
other areas where reasonable cause is similarly lacking.100
The ABA tax section white paper strongly condemned
congressional attempts to foreclose the opportunity for taxpayers to
present mitigating evidence when faced with a penalty assessment. “All
penalties should be subject to a reasonable cause and good faith defense
and no penalty should be imposed without affording an opportunity to
the party who may be sanctioned to defend the conduct,” the paper
said.101 The concern is that removing reasonable cause does not address
abusive transactions or increase voluntary compliance, while at the same
time it greatly increases compliance costs.102 The paper further declared
that “fundamental fairness requires that taxpayers be permitted an
opportunity to contest penalties, and to demonstrate why penalties are
not appropriate in a particular situation.”103
There is worry that Congress could go even further in placing limits
on the reasonable cause defense. Although not adopted as part of the
healthcare reform legislation that also codified the economic substance
doctrine, H.R. 3962 proposed to make some corporations subject to a
more likely than not standard for avoiding penalties on tax

98. Id. at 120.
99. See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124
Stat. 1029 (as signed into law on March 30, 2010).
100. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6664(c)(3), 6695A, 6662(d)(2)(B) (2006).
101. See ABA Report, supra note 58, at 9.
102. Id. at 10.
103. Id. at 9.
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underpayments.104 The proposed legislation would have changed section
6664(c)(3)(A) to make the standard subsection (c)(1) reasonable cause
exception for underpayments inapplicable to certain companies unless
the entity met the more likely than not standard for any given return
position. The affected companies—“specified persons”—would be
corporations that have more than $100 million in gross receipts in any
tax year or that are publicly traded entities with filing requirements
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Those conditions
encompass a large number of corporate taxpayers with long, complicated
returns as a result of normal business activity, and the provisions could
lead to related problems for companies subject to FIN 48 accounting
rules.
Section 6662(d)(2) would also have been amended under the bill to
prevent application of the “substantial authority” and “reasonable basis”
standards to reduce underpayments for any specified person. This
undermines recent efforts to increase taxpayer transparency. The
legislation would affect underpayments arising from transactions entered
into after the enactment date, providing companies with scant time to
implement adequate internal control procedures before any guidance
from the Service could be issued.
While Congress should be concerned about motivating proper
taxpayer behavior, the circumstances addressed by H.R. 3962 have little
to do with compliance. The broad sweep of proposed section 563 of the
bill would affect all corporate transactions, not just those considered tax
shelters under section 6662. Routine non-tax-motivated transactions that
encompass unsettled legal issues would be prime targets. A legitimate
worry is the effect the proposed penalty will have on non-shelter
transactions, as it is not uncommon for large corporations to be unable to
reach the more likely than not standard if there are multiple possible
interpretations of the law.105 For example, if a taxpayer in a common
capitalization issue took a deduction rather capitalizing a repair expense,
and if the IRS felt the entity took the wrong return position, the company
could wind up facing underpayment penalties with no reasonable cause
or other defense.106 And with corporate reporting obligations under FIN
48, the IRS could put companies on the hook for penalties if it

104. See Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. (2009).
105. See Jeremiah Coder, News Analysis: Corporate Penalties in House Healthcare Bill Cause
Concerns, TAX NOTES TODAY 218-1 (2009) (quoting Michael Desmond, former Treasury
legislative counsel).
106. Id.
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questioned whether financial reserves were based on a more likely than
not standard.
In this instance, Congress has found easy money in potentially
collecting penalties for any mistakes large or public corporations make
by simply raising the applicable standard regardless of conduct, while
allowing smaller, shelter-motivated transgressors to avoid enhanced
penalty standards.
The administration and Congress should be
considering appropriate penalties, but in the context of wholesale
reform, in order to improve tax system administration. Focusing on
discrete penalty provisions that raise revenue but add complexity, while
singling out a subset of taxpayers because of their ability to pay, is the
wrong approach. Policy is important when it comes to penalties and the
lack of a cognizant rationale for proposed penalties, such as those in
H.R. 3962, will only weaken the system.
Limiting penalty defenses as part of a rules-based system will also
only serve to increase unintended consequences. One commentator has
observed that removal of the IRS’s authority to waive penalties can be
seen as a lack of confidence in the government’s ability to properly
weigh when waiver is appropriate.107 Carving out particular penalties to
which reasonable cause does not attach runs counter to what Congress
identified in IMPACT as key rationales for having such a defense.108 It
was expected that a reasonable cause exception would help taxpayers
“more easily understand the standards of behavior that is required” of
them, and that the defense would “simplify the administration of these
penalties by the IRS.”109
D.

Lack of Procedural Rights

Another feature of several recently enacted penalty provisions is the
elimination of judicial review of certain penalty determinations. Section
6707A is an example in this regard, as taxpayers cannot challenge in
court the IRS Commissioner’s refusal to abate the penalty.110 Yet,
“judicial review of an IRS decision to impose a penalty or to deny
waiver is an important constitutional check on executive authority.”111
Congressional reaction to IRS lapses regarding tax shelters by removing
107. See Stark, supra note 83, at 121. “[It] reflects a lack of faith (perhaps self-fulfilling) in the
ability of the IRS and the courts to administer discretionary waivers.” Id.
108. See Treasury Report, supra note 3, at 37-39.
109. See H.R. REP. NO. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., at 1392-93 (1989).
110. I.R.C. § 6707A(d)(2) (2006). However, taxpayers can still contest application of the
penalty in the first place.
111. See AICPA Report, supra note 22, at 11.
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certain traditional procedural rights reflects “the height of hubris to think
that an occasional mistake in the administration of penalties warrants the
elimination of the opportunity for administrative judgment calls.”112
Fairness is one of the underlying concerns at play here. Outside of
the strict liability context, when mitigating circumstances exist,
taxpayers are afforded the chance to the present those facts to the IRS
for its discretion in administering penalties.113 If a taxpayer is no longer
able to rely on that discretion, the IRS is deprived of the ability to
exercise consistency and impartiality across the board to all taxpayers.114
It also harms the effectiveness of the tax system when the penalty must
be applied in inappropriate circumstances but mitigation is foreclosed.
The discretion available to the IRS should be “appropriately calibrated”
so that “IRS personnel have neither too much nor too little discretion.”115
There is tension between noncompliance resulting from honest taxpayer
mistakes and willful noncompliance, and a similar incongruence
between administrative simplicity and complexity. If the IRS doesn’t
pay attention to either penalty design or administration, “the penalties
may be unfair in their application to situations involving different
underlying causes.”116
Policy advocates also are distressed by the fact that penalties can be
imposed on taxpayers for transactions entered into and reported on a
return before the IRS makes a determination that a transaction is
reportable.117 For example, in the case of reportable transactions, the
IRS can issue a notice that a particular transaction is “listed” and thus
subject to specific disclosure standards or else a penalty applies.118 But
it can be several years after a taxpayer’s transaction occurs that the IRS
determines it is abusive and crafts rules to clamp down on such

112. See Stark, supra note 83, at 142. Stark also warned that “removing waiver authority
creates a Procrustean bed that can and will deflect energy from regulating overly aggressive conduct
and toward debate regarding the perceived procedural unfairness of abolishing traditional defenses
and ambiguously defining critical terms.” Id. at 147.
113. See Treasury Report, supra note 3, at 38 (“administrative discretion also is exercised in
evaluating the facts and circumstances weighing for or against imposition of a penalty”).
114. Id. (“Fairness requires that this discretion be exercised with consistency and impartiality
such that similar situations are not treated differently.”).
115. Id. (“Fairness also involves providing taxpayers with opportunity to have their interests
heard and considered.”).
116. Id. at 37.
117. See AICPA Report, supra note 22, at 6 (“In the case of listed transactions and transactions
of interest, ‘participation’ may be defined in the notice identifying the transaction as a listed
transaction or a transaction of interest. These notices can be issued years after the tax year in which
the transaction occurred, compounding the problem of complying up front with vague standards.”).
118. See I.R.C. §§ 6011, 6111, 6112 and accompanying regulations (2006).
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transactions. The retroactivity of applying new rules to completed
transactions flies in the face of fair notice to the taxpayer of what
conduct is acceptable.119
More and more, the IRS is using automated processes to assess
These administrative mechanisms put
penalties on taxpayers.120
taxpayers in a tough position if they are not afforded the ability to
contest penalties before payment is expected by the Service.121
Automatic penalty application should still allow the taxpayer “an
opportunity to demonstrate why the penalties are not applicable to a
particular situation.”122 And inconsistencies regarding which penalties
have pre-assessment rights makes it unfair for a taxpayer to dispute one
penalty but not another. The ABA tax section white paper warned that
“the perception of fairness in the administration of civil tax penalties is
critical to fostering taxpayer’s respect for the tax law.”123
The fear is that it is possible for the IRS to abuse its position when
a taxpayer has no direct recourse to dispute a penalty determination.124
Without adequate oversight or instruction, examining agents can have
relative immunity for taking an aggressive interpretation that a taxpayer
did not have authority to take a certain return position and thus is subject
to an accuracy-related penalty. While widespread abuse by the IRS is
unlikely, even a few isolated examples of egregious circumstances can
cause substantial damage to the tax system’s reputation.125 The 1999
Treasury report cautioned that “the manner or methods by which the IRS
collects taxes and deals with taxpayers may be as important as the
penalty and interest provisions in affecting compliance.”126
Penalty abatement is a longstanding and frequent occurrence by the
IRS, as borne out by IRS data. For example, numbers supplied by the

119. See AICPA Report, supra note 22, at 6.
120. See 2008 NTA Report, supra note 1, at 16.
121. See AICPA Report, supra note 22, at 11. “In general, this would include the right to an
independent review by the IRS Appeals office, as well as access to the courts. Pre-assessment
rights are particularly important where the underlying tax provision or penalty standards are
complex, the amount of the penalty is high, or fact-specific defenses such as reasonable cause are
available.” Id.
122. See ABA Report, supra note 58, at 8.
123. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
124. See Hill & Minkovich, supra note 86, at 4 (noting that the lack of “protection against
potentially arbitrary or capricious actions by the commissioner” are “objectionable from a
fundamental due process standpoint as well as on sound tax policy grounds.”).
125. See Stretch et al., supra note 65, at 1361 (“A similar cynicism caused by application of the
[codified economic substance] penalty to sympathetic taxpayers would have a corrosive effect on
compliance.”).
126. See Treasury Report, supra note 3, at 40.
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annual IRS data book for years 2007 through 2009 show that the IRS
regularly abates roughly 30 percent of penalties for individual taxpayers,
including accuracy-related penalties, and has abated penalties for
corporate taxpayers in the range of 45 to 70 percent each year.127 Stark
has described this as a picture of “virtually inevitable administrative
reversal of proposed accuracy-related penalties.”128 And the NTA has
said that “frequent penalty abatements could reflect a problem in the
underlying tax assessment process.”129
E.

Penalties as Revenue Raisers

By their nature, penalties have the incidental effect of raising
revenue by imposing a cost on noncompliance. But using penalties as a
direct tool to raise money is inapposite to the goals of a properly
functioning penalty system as it puts the focus on offsetting other tax
changes rather than encouraging voluntary compliance.130 Yet that
seems to be a motive—indirect, if not perhaps direct—behind some of
the recent penalty enactments and proposals.131
Critics have spoken frequently on the dangers of using penalties as
revenues raisers, warning that such use leads to serious damage to the
underlying principles of IRS penalty policy. As noted by the ABA tax
section, “looking to penalties to offset tax expenditures risks
incentivizing the Service to impose and to sustain penalties—particularly
large dollar penalty amounts—wherever it can be done, regardless of
whether penalties are appropriate in a particular case, and regardless of
the consequences for the tax system that can result from even the
perception of random or unfair application of tax penalties.”132
One practitioner has characterized revenue raising through the use
of strict liability penalties as “poor tax policy and an unsatisfactory
rationale.”133 Indeed, the same practitioner has openly criticized

127. See Jeremiah Coder, Data Book Snapshot: 2009 Civil Penalties and Chief Counsel
Workload, TAX NOTES 1454 (2010).
128. See Stark, supra note 83, at 139.
129. See NTA 2008 Report, supra note 1, at 15.
130. See Treasury Report, supra note 3, at 36. “Penalties may raise revenue collaterally but
this should not be a deliberate objective of penalty design and doing so can create perverse
incentives.” Id.
131. See Mik Shin-Li, Strictly Wrong As a Tax Policy: The Strict Liability Penalty Standards
in Noneconomic Substance Transactions, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 17 (2010-2011) (“Tax penalties as
revenue raisers at best involve mixed motives and at worst become arbitrary punishment of the
taxpayers, which is not within the role of tax penalties.”).
132. See ABA Report, supra note 58, at 11.
133. See Hill & Minkovich, supra note 86, at 2.
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Congress for its “avowed and all-too-transparent purpose for enacting
strict liability penalties without judicial recourse [in order] to raise
revenue.”134
Government officials have privately admitted that money inflows
expected from certain penalty proposals are part of a penalty’s attraction.
In regard to attempts to codify the economic substance doctrine, with its
attached strictly liability penalty, Joshua Odintz, former tax counsel to
the Senate Finance Committee, remarked at a 2007 conference that
“whether economic substance codification is good policy or not, it’s
money on the table.”135 Former Treasury tax legislative counsel Michael
Desmond likewise acknowledged that economic substance codification
and penalties have been popular among congressional members because
there is “a lot of money associated with [it].”136
But one of the problems in looking at penalties as a means for
budget offsets is the inherent difficulty of placing a monetary value on
them. The attempt to codify the economic substance doctrine is a prime
example of valuation uncertainties. A proposal in the 109th Congress to
codify the economic substance doctrine was scored by the Joint
Committee on Taxation at around $17 billion.137 Subsequent legislative
proposals have progressively seen the associated revenue score drop
measurably. In 2007, a JCT score of a codification proposal was
estimated at $10 billion. The JCT estimate for the 2010 reconciliation
package that finally enacted economic substance codification was
pegged at only $4.5 billion.138 The inherent difficulty of predicting
taxpayer behavior makes revenue-guessing quite speculative in the area
of penalties.139 As previously alluded to in the beginning background
section of this essay, “the best penalty would be the one that is so

134. Id. at 6.
135. See Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Economic Substance Codification Coming, TAX
NOTES TODAY 196-3 (2007).
136. See Jeremiah Coder, Desmond Says Legislative Outlook Driven by Pay-Go, TAX NOTES
TODAY 107-2 (2007).
137. See JCT Scores Senate-Passed Tax Relief Act (JCX-9-06), TAX NOTES TODAY 27-14
(2006).
138. See JCT Estimates Budget Effects of Combined Housing Healthcare Reform Legislation
(JCX-17-10), TAX NOTES TODAY 55-22 (2010).
139. See 2008 NTA Report, supra note 1, at 5 n.11 (“Revenue generated directly from new
penalties can be taken into account in connection with the federal budget ‘scoring’ process, but any
resulting effect on voluntary compliance can probably not be taken into account given the lack of
quantitative research in this area.”).
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effective it virtually eliminates noncompliance and thus results in no
penalty revenues.”140
It is particularly discouraging that, on Capitol Hill, some lawmakers
have forsaken essential penalty principles and now believe that penalties
should be pursued simply because they raise revenue. Congress needs
lots of money to fund its long list of legislative priorities, but subverting
tax policy to get that money is wrong. As already stated, there is scant
support for the theory that efforts to put a dollar amount on what penalty
provisions might raise are even reasonable. The 2008 National
Taxpayer Advocate report lamented that “policymakers lack the
information they need . . . to accurately estimate the budget effect of
changes to the penalty rules.”141 What is certain is that corporate costs
will increase as companies to try to meet higher standards of authority—
whether at a more likely than not or some other threshold—because
sometimes it just simply is not possible for a company to get to more
likely than not on certain tax positions when the tax law is not clear. So
corporations subject to the proposed penalty provisions would either
have to expend significant resources trying to cover themselves with
strong opinions, or not even try out of a sense of futility.
F.

Tax Shelter Effects

Many of the changes in the past decade to the tax code regarding
penalty provisions have been driven by the government’s increasing
desire to combat tax shelters. Indeed, reportable transactions and strict
liability penalties that have radically changed the penalty system are the
result of an overreaction by Congress to a small segment of taxpayers
abusing the tax code to avoid paying taxes. But are tax shelter-driven
reforms good for the tax system? The author believes not.
The creation of tax shelter penalties in particular tend to arise from
lack of enforcement of current penalty provisions and so often end up
producing a “stacked” effect. The main effect of stacking—whereby
multiple penalties overlap in applying to a particular transaction—is to
produce aggregate penalty amounts that are disproportionate to the
degree of misconduct or harm.142 Another result is over-disclosure,
140. See Stark, supra note 83, at 121. That view is mirrored by former IRS commissioner N.
Jerold Cohen. See Jeremiah Coder, Tax Shelter Penalties are Unclear and Weakly Enforced,
Panelists Say, TAX NOTES TODAY 145-3 (2008) (quoting Cohen, “But the best penalties are those
that don’t raise any revenue because they encourage the conduct that the penalty is designed to
encourage.”).
141. See 2008 NTA Report, supra note 1, at 5.
142. See AICPA Report, supra note 22, at 7.
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which causes taxpayers to have to report positions for which they have
adequate authority and only swamps the IRS with additional forms to
process.143
Fundamentally, the underlying policy goals of tax administration
devoted to voluntary compliance are sound and should not be jettisoned
in response to the attacks emanating from tax shelters.144 The
overarching goals of fairness, comprehensibility, effectiveness, and ease
of administration remain and can stand up to the challenges posed by tax
law manipulations. Just as in the past, our tax system will weather this
cycle of shelter activity, but it should do so while staying true to the
fundamentals of its penalty regime.
IV. POSSIBLE REFORMS
The problem with any reform of the civil penalty tax system is
making it stick so that future penalties do not go astray from promoting
voluntary compliance. Although restructuring may work for a while,
history has shown that the trend is for Congress to eventually go back to
instituting new penalties misaligned with overall policy goals, and for
the IRS to craft a complicated compliance regime. That certainly has
been the fact after the past several attempts at major penalty reform. As
Tax Court Judge Robert Wherry acknowledged in conference remarks in
2010, past efforts have only borne short-term fruit: even with the great
strides of IMPACT, the last round of penalty reform “didn’t get the job
done.”145
Some will view the following ideas as far-fetched and impractical.
Both are potentially valid criticisms, but the proposals at least serve as
an initial framework for (hopefully) serious discussion about the issue of
comprehensive penalty reform.
A.

Penalty Review

Increasing the frequency or scope of review of penalties by
Congress and the IRS/Treasury is not necessarily a new or unexpected

143. See Coder, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 4 (quoting Tom
Ochsenschlager as saying that over-disclosure will not be effective because the IRS can’t handle the
volume, and taxpayers shouldn’t have to disclose transactions for which they have adequate support.
“Substantial authority is an appropriate standard.”).
144. However, for a bleaker assessment, see id. (quoting a practitioner as saying: “In my
practice, I’ve never seen penalties be a deterrent factor in any action taken by a taxpayer.”).
145. See Jeremiah Coder, Practitioners, Officials Debate Prospect of Civil Penalty Reform,
TAX NOTES TODAY 16-5 (2010).
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proposal. Legislation enacted in 2010 requires annual reports by the IRS
to Congress on penalties assessed for undisclosed reportable
transactions—the section 6707A penalty—as well as other tax shelter
penalties, including sections 6662A, 6700(a), 6707, and 6708.146
Stakeholder groups also recognize the value that comes from having
better penalty information available, calling for the IRS to provide
“periodic and increased analysis and reporting on effectiveness of
penalty administration.”147
The NTA has been particularly vocal regarding the necessity of an
improved penalty reporting system. The 2008 NTA report took the IRS
to task for having “no significant quantitative data to show how penalties
affect voluntary compliance.”148 The report lamented the fact that:
the IRS either does not assess or does not track assessment of many
current penalties, much less study them in a comprehensive manner.
As a result, policymakers lack the information they need to structure
and administer tax penalties to maximize voluntary compliance or even
to accurately estimate the budget effect of changes to the penalty
rules.149

The “dearth of information” surrounding penalties frustrate
effective review of the system. “The Service does not regularly make
public reports of its efforts to comply with [IRS Policy Statement 201],” the ABA paper complained.150 The information provided by the
IRS, mainly through its annual data book, is helpful only to a limited
degree because of the aggregation format into broad penalty categories.
Further, mining the data and delivering more targeted reports would be
of tremendous assistance to tax policymakers.151 The National Taxpayer
Advocate has asked Congress to direct the IRS to “conduct an empirical
study to quantify the effect of each penalty on voluntary compliance.”152
More comprehensive reporting of penalty data would significantly
enhance the ability of Congress and tax administrators to evaluate how
penalties, as applied in practice, are affecting tax administration.

146. See Small Business Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 111-240, § 2103, 124 Stat. 2504 (2010).
147. See ABA Report, supra note 58, at 13.
148. See 2008 NTA Report, supra note 1, at 5.
149. Id.
150. See ABA Report, supra note 58, at 13.
151. See Stark, supra note 83, at 120. “[N]ot much has been done to follow penalties more
closely. Penalty statutes, like the substantive law, have been constantly amended and updated,
drawing into question the comparability of data from year to year.” Id.
152. See 2008 NTA Report, supra note 1, at 6.
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Increasing Certainty

Many of the heated discussions stemming from the recently enacted
accuracy-related and information reporting penalties in sections 6662,
6662A, 6707, 6707A, and 6694 are a direct byproduct of Congress’s
inability to write clear rules for taxpayers and practitioners to follow. A
good number of tax literature pages have been devoted to complaining
about the difficulty in following the tax law because of perceived
ambiguity. Thus, part of the solution to an unmoored penalty regime
needs to be a greater emphasis within Congress, and by extension, the
IRS, in creating regulations on producing guidance to clarify the vast
pools of tax law uncertainty.153
Many tax return positions result from uncertainty about the law,
especially when it comes to recently enacted code provisions. Because
there may be contradictory judicial interpretations or no guidance in a
particular area of tax law, corporations engaged in complicated business
transactions may lack confidence about treatment of a tax issue. As one
practitioner noted, “taxpayers should not be punished for taking goodfaith tax positions.”154 Yet the proposed legislation in H.R. 3962 would
also have eliminated the penalty protection afforded taxpayers for
specifically disclosing an uncertain tax position to the IRS, running in
direct contrast to government efforts to increase transparency and bring
about more disclosure of uncertain tax positions.
In recognition of those compliance difficulties, the IRS seems to be
shifting toward greater willingness to issue “pretty good” guidance to
resolve some issues in a timely manner instead of taking years to
comprehensively tackle all compliance uncertainties for a particular tax
issue.155
C.

Graduated Penalties

Establishing more penalties with a graduated structure could help
solve some of the problems associated with strict liability. As Stark puts
it, “stepped” penalties respond so that “the more egregious conduct and
the less responsive taxpayers are penalized more seriously.”156 The

153. See Stretch et al., supra note 65, at 1359. “[T]he factors identified by Treasury and the
IRS in guidance are able to drive taxpayer or preparer behavior.” Id.
154. See Jeremiah Coder, News Analysis: Corporate Penalties in House Healthcare Bill Cause
Concerns, TAX NOTES TODAY 218-1 (2009).
155. See Amy S. Elliott, ‘Pretty Good’ Guidance Should Be Good Enough for IRS, Official
Says, TAX NOTES TODAY 233-4 (2010).
156. See Stark, supra note 83, at 124.
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section 6651 failure to file penalty is an example of a penalty rate
increasing in some proportion to the perceived egregiousness of the
noncompliance. The penalty is imposed at a rate of 5 percent per month
past the date a return is due, and caps out at a maximum of 25 percent.
So a taxpayer filing his return one month late would pay a 5 percent
penalty on the net amount of unpaid tax, would pay 10 percent if filing
two months late, and so on. The failure to pay penalty operates in a
similar fashion. One scholar has opined that graduated rates make a
“penalty much milder for many taxpayers.”157
The 1999 Treasury report recognized that a penalty regime must
“distinguish
among
the
different
underlying
causes
of
158
noncompliance.”
It recommended that the section 6651 failure to file
penalty be further revised to reduce the penalty to 0.5 percent for the
first 6 months, and increasing to 1 percent a month beyond that, up to a
maximum 25 percent cap.159 The proposal was based on the belief that
getting rid of the front-loading nature of the penalty would “provide
continuing incentive for correction” to encourage noncompliant
taxpayers to get right sooner rather than later, if at all.160
The principle of targeting noncompliance through penalty amounts
that best correspond to the level of culpability or harm to the system is
worth serious consideration, and a graduated system can give effect to
that objective. That seems to be part of the calculus in amended section
6707A. Tying the penalty amount for section 6707A in between the
minimum floor and maximum cap thresholds to 75 percent of the
resulting tax benefit that was not disclosed is a better start than imposing
a blanket unreviewable fine.
An even better solution though would be to base the section 6707A
penalty amount on some sort of time scale like the one used in section
6651. Currently, the automatic penalty of $100,000 for individuals with
listed transactions provides no motivation for self-correction if the
taxpayer discovers post-filing that the transaction should have been
reported; the lack of incentive to file amended returns leaves some
taxpayers willing to play the audit lottery. Something akin to an
increasing penalty rate by month seems to be a more reasonable
mechanism to structure the penalty so as to encourage voluntary
compliance with the tax code rather than swinging the hammer with no
157.
(2009).
158.
159.
160.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2012

See William A. Drennan, Strict Liability and Tax Penalties, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 41
Treasury Report, supra note 3, at 37.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 65.

29

Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 27 [2012], Art. 5

11- CODER_MACRO FINAL.DOCM

182

4/11/2012 1:25 PM

AKRON TAX JOURNAL

[27:153

chance of limited relief. Because the noncompliance at issue in section
6707A and other information reporting penalties is disclosure rather than
substantive tax law, a graduated arrangement make sense.161
D.

Penalty Sunsets

A possible mechanism for enhancing the effectiveness of the
penalty system is requiring regular congressional review of existing
penalty provisions. Essentially, this could be accomplished via a
mandatory sunset of most penalties, say every five years.
What this might accomplish is a recurring review of the
justification for, and practical administrative effects of, certain civil tax
penalties. Far too often, after significant penalty reform is achieved,
Congress gums up the system with additional penalties that forsake the
voluntary compliance imperative. This leads to the complexity,
stacking, and unintended consequences that has consistently occurred
over a period of time. Over time, penalties may fall into disuse;
legislative review would help remove unnecessary provisions from an
already lengthy and complex tax code.
If the IRS, through the OSP or another investigative reporting
mechanism, provided detailed analysis of how the penalty regime is
operating, Congress could, on a frequent basis, reexamine how to best
encourage voluntary compliance and stick to the overarching goals of
penalties in tax administration. There are already a number of tax law
provisions that expire on a regular basis. For example, a panoply of tax
credits (so-called tax extenders) comes up every calendar year for
Congress to routinely reauthorize. So renewing penalties on a
predetermined cycle is not without precedent.
The author admits that the effectiveness of penalty sunsets is
uncertain. After all, in the debate surrounding extension of expiring tax
credit provisions each year, the focus of members of Congress are not
always on a substantive review of such laws, but rather the aggregate
cost and required offsets. However, it is arguably easier to provide for
ongoing legislative tinkering with penalty sections rather than relying on
the uncertainty of when Congress might have the fortitude to tackle even
one or two particular penalty provisions. If the history of recent
legislative action on tax provisions is any indicator of the future, it will
become more and more difficult for Congress to muster the will to tackle
161. See 2008 NTA Report, supra note 1, at 26. As the 2008 NTA report noted in connection
with the section 6651 penalty, it is better to make a penalty “more proportionate to the length of the
delinquency, without increasing the rate to such an extent that the penalty itself discourages filing.”
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changes to the tax code, especially when doing so requires revenue
offsets.
A recurring opportunity to review penalty provisions would allow
taxpayers and practitioners to make a strong case for tweaking or
eliminating penalties that are not working in line with outlined tax policy
goals. Requiring Congress to affirmatively vote to continue a particular
penalty could provide hope that the penalty system will be purged on
repeated intervals so as to avoid the penalty creep that often necessitates
wholesale reform. It is better to compel regular flushings than wait for
the dam to burst.
E.

Penalty Ombudsman

Another suggestion is for Congress to establish a centralized role
within the government to handle penalty data and policy. This would be
in keeping with a recent trend toward expanding ombudsman functions
within the federal government.162
Admittedly, the creation of the OSP was supposed to handle such
functions.163 But if the IRS continues to neglect full utilization of the
office, giving some measure of authority to a penalty ombudsman could
help ensure better penalty information collection and its distillation to
the tax community.164 While pending legislative proposals would
require annual reports to Congress of reportable transaction
nondisclosure penalties, regular reports to the legislative branch should
encompass the whole penalty regime. A single function devoted to the
work necessary to produce this report should be established.
Because of the important role penalties play in the healthy
functioning of our voluntary assessment tax system, comprehensive and
detailed analysis of how penalties are operating is essential. A useful
model is the National Taxpayer Advocate. A penalty point person
would not necessarily need to have the visibility or range of authority
that the NTA possesses, because the Taxpayer Advocate Service

162. SEE TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., NATIONAL TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE: 2009 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS VOL. 2: RESEARCH AND RELATED STUDIES 107
(2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/09_tas_arc_vol_2.pdf (last visited Feb. 19,
2011) (TAS identified 44 federal ombudsmen offices in 2009, up from 26 identified in 2003).
163. See I.R.M. 20.1.1.1.3 (Dec. 11, 2009).
164. See AICPA Report, supra note 22, at 16 (“The IRS should evaluate whether the
Servicewide Penalties Group is the best office to have overall responsibility for penalty
administration and if so, whether the placement of that office within the IRS organization is optimal
to allow that office to perform its mission, including evaluating and coordinating penalty
administration throughout the major Operating Divisions.”).
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operates on a broad spectrum of assisting taxpayers across all
administrative functions. But just as the NTA is able to make a strong
case for correcting tax system deficiencies, a penalty ombudsman
focused solely on penalty issues could effectively advocate for needed
changes to the penalty regime while keeping tabs on the day-to-day
functioning of penalties in the tax system.
V. CONCLUSION
The drift over two decades away from solid principles of what
should constitute the penalty system, drawn from careful study, has left
the current system in a disconcerting place. Despite occasional
rumblings of tackling penalty reform, real strides toward that end might
not be made until the IRS again takes the lead. As indicated by both the
GAO and NTA reports, the real need is for the Service to gather
appropriate empirical data on how penalties are working in the current
system. The Taxpayer Advocate has emphasized that “policymakers
lack the information they need to structure and administer tax penalties
to maximize voluntary compliance or even to accurately estimate the
budget effect of changes to the penalty rules.”165
Attempts by both the GAO and the NTA to produce meaningful
measurements on penalties were largely unsuccessful, highlighting the
need for action by the IRS. Indeed, the NTA report specifically
recommended that Congress have the Service “collect and analyze more
detailed penalty data on a regular basis” and “conduct an empirical study
to quantify the effect of each penalty on voluntary compliance.”166
It is unlikely that the legislative staffs on Capitol Hill have the data
or resources to pull together an exhaustive study on tax penalties. So it
will be up to the IRS to initiate a tax penalty project—perhaps a working
group similar to the 1980s task force. The question is whether this is a
task the Service is willing to take on right now, because there already are
substantial new administrative tax programs in play, including IRS
projects that regulate tax return preparers and another requiring
corporate reporting of uncertain tax positions.
Penalty reform has languished for years despite a critical need for
it, but it is uncertain whether the political will to maintain a serious
dialogue on the subject exists. An outward commitment by the IRS in
reestablishing a penalty reform task force could be an effective
mechanism toward eventual legislative overhaul.
Despite the
165. See 2008 NTA Report, supra note 1, at 5.
166. Id. at 6.
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considerable resources that such a project would involve, it is a goal
worth pursuing. Returning to the fundamental principles expressed by
the 1989 IRS Task Force is essential because that probing document was
designed to be a “guide for future legislative efforts and administrative
actions.”167 Furthermore, those recommendations still hold true today.
The challenge ahead is that once significant penalty reform is
achieved, Congress and the IRS must ensure that it is long-lasting. A
number of the proposals in this paper would help focus Congress and the
IRS on sustaining the improvements made to the penalty regime.
Establishing a process for more detailed reporting of penalty information
will aid thoughtful examination of penalty operations within tax
administration. A penalty ombudsman to act as a champion for data
collection,
good
administrative
practices,
and
legislative
recommendations would help consolidate responsibilities that are
currently housed in a variety of agency functions. Requiring Congress
to reauthorize penalty provisions on a regular basis might give taxpayers
and tax administrators a better opportunity to examine deficiencies in the
existing penalty structure and suggest appropriate modifications.
The pursuit to keep our tax penalty system fair, effective,
comprehensible, and administrable so as to drive voluntary taxpayer
compliance is worth this effort.

167. IRS Task Force Report, supra note 8, at acknowledgements section.
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